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AN ALTERNATIVE TO
"UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL PROCESSES
BRUCE 1. BROWN, Ph.D.

I

have been a student of psychology now
for twenty-two years. As far back as I
can remember, I have had a lingering question: "How can such an important
characteristic of mankind as the
unconscious mind escape any mention in
the scriptures:' After all, if our actions are
controlled by a part of us that is beyond
our awareness and our introspection, then
a knowledge of this unexperienced
"agency" is essential if we are to have a correct understanding of the meaning and
purpose of life.
The question has not seemed urgent,
but it has been perennial. I have heard a
number of trivial answers to the question
over the years, (like "the scriptures also
don't mention the existence of an
hypothalamus or a pituitary gland"), and
I have heard a number of testimonials
from clinical practitioners as to the reality
of the Freudian unconscious, but the question has still remained.
I do not dismiss lightly the observations (clinical anecdotes as well as some
of the research findings) upon which
"unconscious" theory is based. But I do
doubt the "received view;' the commonly
accepted theoretical explanations that are
given for such observations, and I have for
as long as I can remember. I am now quite
sure that these theoretical explanations of
such observations are wrong, and wrong
in a fundamental way.
My view of theories in the behavioral
sciences has evolved into a general rule-if
you are going to bet on one, bet that it
is false. The only question is how much
of it is false. For me the major issue has

not been how to deal with or "inte
such theories with my most deepl
beliefs. I view theories as only scaffo
helpful in finding otherwise overl
observations. I see no reason for try
reconcile or integrate psychological
to one's faith. The major issue, I b
is to seek to understand how observ
that have been corroborated convin
and repeatedly can fit within the re
perspective of eternal man.
During the middle 70s I was p
a research group at BYU in wh
number of us jointly pursued topics
to the question of "unconscious m
processes". Much of my current th
on these issues has been shaped
influenced by the ideas of the colle
in that group. Although we only m
a year or two, my own researc
writing were enriched for many year
by the ideas that came out of
meetings.
It wasn't until almost five year
those meetings ended that some
began to come into place for me
respect to the lingering question
"unconscious". A number of ideas
verged in a kind of "aha" experienc
for the first time I began to see a
alternative to the "split psyche" kin
explanation. It wasn't something
ready to try out on someone e
couldn't find words for it. But I fe
my own question was settled in a wa
was personally satisfying.
In the years since then, I have
to integrate that inchoate but illumi
insight into my research and writing
I even tried to explain it to others in
forum address (Brown, 1983) and la
AMCAP talk (Brown, 1985). But
complex and many-faceted collect
ideas, and it is always an unsati
experience to try to explain it in a
minute lecture. It is certainly n
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original contribution (if such really exists),
but an integration of the work of a
number of theorists in psychology and
philosophy. A one-semester course where
all can investigate a number of sources
together is more adequate than a lecture
or a paper as a forum for dealing with it.
Nevertheless, being an optimist, I will now
try to review some of those sources and
sketch the outline of those ideas in this
paper. The paper will undoubtedly be,
from your perspective, too long, and from
mine, too short.
If I were to try now to summarize this
view in a few sentences I would say that
the same phenomena that have been taken
to be evidence for unconscious mental processes can be equally well accounted for
using simpler and less sensational principles of holistic perception, similar to
those put forth by the Gestalt
psychologists. The Freudian unconscious
is an invention rather than a discovery. It
is an artifact of atomism. ('Atomism" is the
behavioristic fallacy of separating incoming information into discrete stimulus units
and human action into discrete response
units.) As soon as one looks at perception
and human action holistically rather than
atomistically, the paradoxes that drive such
theorists to posit two minds disappear.
I would further argue that the
received cognitivist view is wrong in its
implicit assumption that we are for the
most part explicitly aware of our thoughts,
perceptions and actions. When one views
perception this way, then it is surprising
to find evidence that some things are
perceived without awareness. From within
this view, "subliminal perception" is a
momentous discovery.
I reject the "subliminal perception as
a special case" view. On the contrary, I
hold that the great majority of human
knowledge and interaction remains inarticulate, tacit and holistic, and it takes
mental work to spell it out. In other words
most of our mental life is tacit, and the
thing to be explained as a special case is
how we make any of our experience
explicit or articulate. We know more than
we can say. To articulate what we know
or what we experience is a kind of achieve-
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ment that requires mental work, but it
usually falls short of the greater inarticulate knowledge that we have. An
attempt to capture human knowledge and
experience in a cage of words will often
involve distortion and will always be
incomplete.
That is the short form of the argument. Now in the remainder of the paper
I will try the long form, beginning with
a review of the philosophical objections
to the psychodynamic view. Armed with
these logical arguments against
"unconscious" theory, we will look at their
relevance to the models of contemporary
cognitive and social psychology. Then,
after comparing the various forms of the
"unconscious mind" concept, in the last
half of the paper we will examine an alternative form of explanation based upon
Polanyi's philosophy of tacit knowing,
Gibson's holistic perceptual theory and
some implications of contemporary
psychopsychics. The essential ideas of the
argument will proceed something like this:
1) Although many clinicians still take the

psychodynamic view of mental life as a
given, existential philosophers such as
Sartre and Fingarette have convincingly
demonstrated that this "received view" is
logically bankrupt. It is conceptually flawed
beyond repair.
2) After a stormy forty year history, the
concept of "unconscious mental processes"
is now an accepted part of contemporary
cognitive science. That is, in almost total
disregard of the telling logical arguments
against the two-agent psychodynamic view,
contemporary cognitive theorists have
adopted a version of it in their information
processing models. Most cognitive theorists
erroneously think that a computer
metaphor solves the logical problems, but
it does not, and the cognitive models can
be faulted on the same grounds as the
psychodynamic ones.
3) These issues and arguments are central
to a number of research traditions within
psychology, including the perceptual
defense and vigilance literature, the related
subliminal perception literature, the
cognitive dissonance and attribution theory
traditions within social psychology, and the
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"split-span attention" research tradition
within cognitive psychology.
4) Within this diverse potpourri of
psychological research and theory, two
paradoxes can be identified. One has to do
with how one can perceive without
awareness (the subliminal perception
paradox), and the other has to do with
resistance.
S) Both paradoxes are an indication of the
need for a reconceptualization, a transformation in the way such things are viewed.
A proposal will be offered based upon
Polanyi's philosophy of tacit knowledge,
Gibson's ecological approach to perception
and recent developments in psychophysics.
6) This proposed approach is referred to as
"transparency theory;' but it is really more
of a meta-theory. That is, rather than offering an alternative theoretical explanation for
old observations, it is a transformation of
vision that affects the empirical observations themselves. It involves a more careful
reading of the primary data that obviates
the need for heavy, occult explanatory
burdens like the "unconscious:'

Objections to Psychodynamic Theory
from Existentialist Philosophers.

Although there has been much
interest over the years in providing
empirical evidence for the concept of an
unconscious, the primary motivation for
the concept has not been empirical. Its
roots are rather in the ubiquitous observation of resistance in therapy and in
everyday life. Admittedly there have been
many studies over the past 50 years aimed
at demonstrating the existence of the
"unconscious" or "unconscious mental processes." (Witness, for example, the
thousands of studies in the "perceptual
defense" tradition.) But the studies have
been a search for corroboration of the concept rather than the source of that concept.
That is not to say that the concept doesn't
have some basis in observation, but its
primary basis is subjective clinical
experience rather than the results of
research.
The clinical phenomenon of resistance
is closely related to the psychodynamic
concept of repression, the concept of "self-

deception" from existentialist philos
and more informal concepts that
from clinical practice such as "self-de
behaviors:' Although these concept
come from diverse traditions, the
important similarites. All have in co
the observation of apparently purp
actions that seem to be contradict
the person's avowed intentions.
strange state of affairs can be illus
by an example from the existen
Sarte's (1953, pp. 96-98) descripti
"self-deception" - his well-known
ple of the woman who colludes in he
seduction. The man's intention
obvious to anyone but her, and ev
own actions indicate some kind o
ticulate awareness of his intentions
actions are complementary to his in
that could only be described as purp
and intentional. Yet one could not de
her protestations of innocence as
Sartre (p. 88) maintains that in a c
lie one creates for the other a "tra
dent" character, a self that does not
It is intended only for the consumpt
the other; the liar is not himself ta
by it. But she seems to '1ie to
sincerity;' to be fully taken in b
description of things. When and if he
were to become clear to her, she wo
genuinely surprised. But if one were
to point out her complicity to he
would not receive the information
way one would expect of innocenc
would resist and protest. The
deception phenomenon, then
distinguished from cynical lying b
prise and from ignorance/innocen
resistance as diagrammed below:
surprise
cynical lying
self-deception
ignorance

resi

§j~

If it is a lie, then it is one that

to be believed by the liar, hence the
"self-deception:' But if we look at the
of what we have just said, it is c

AMCAP JOURNAL / NOVEMBER 1985

paradoxical. For as the deceiver one must
know, but as the deceived one must not.
In Sartre's words, "I must know the truth
very exactly in order to conceal it more
carefully-and this not at two different
moments, which at a pinch would allow
us to re-establish a semblance of dualitybut in the unitary structure of a single project" (p. 89). After giving examples of the
ubiquity of the phenomenon he concludes,
"Our embarrassment then appears extreme
since we can neither reject nor comprehend
bad faith" (p. 90). ''Bad faith" is the translation usually given to mauvaise foi, the
phrase Sartre uses to refer to self deception.
One way of viewing the
psychodynamic concept of the
unconscious is as a way of dealing with
the paradox of resistance, the same
paradox philosophers refer to as the
paradox of self-deception. By positing two
minds within the person, it is possible to
think of the person as being at one and
the same time both the deceiver and the
deceived. The resisting client is not one but
two, and one part wants to help the
therapist deal with the problem while the
other blocks his efforts to uncover it. The
paradox disappears! It is a shallow and ad
hoc way of dealing with the logical problem, but it is amazingly current. As will
be shown in the next section, it is closely
parallel to recently proposed solutions
(Dixon, 1971 and Erdelyi, 1974) to the
perceptual defense paradox (which is a
special case of the self deception paradox).
Sartre (1953, pp. 86-96) has raised a
number of objections on logical grounds
to this Freudian way of dealing with the
resistance paradox. His arguments are
incisive but subtle. On successive
rereadings it becomes overwhelmingly
apparent that there is no hope for the
psychoanalytic model as a way of comprehending "bad faith:' Among other
objections he argues that:
(1) The act of resistance implies a selfreflective consciousness which could certainly not be characteristic of the raw
instinctual impulses that are attributed to
the Id. (p. 92)
(2) It cannot be the Ego which resists, for
the information is repressed in order to hide
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it from the Ego. The self-deception would
then be entirely conscious. Nothing is
added to the logical dilemma by positing
an unconscious if this is the case (pp. 9293). Also, if the repression were an act of
the Ego it would also be necessary for the
Ego to repress the act of repression and then
to in turn repress the knowledge of this
second repressive act, and so on to an
infinite regress, since the act of repression
has implicit within it the reason for repression. (See Fingarette, 1969, p. 114, for a
lucid summary of this Sartrian point.)
(3) Freud's positing of a censor "as a line of
demarcation (between conscious and
unconscious) with customs, passport division, currency control, etc., to reestablish
the duality of the deceiver and the deceived"
(p. 90) also will not work. It only relocates
the paradoxical duality at the level of the
censor (pp. 93-94). In other words, the censor must be in "bad faith;' which is still
paradoxical.
(4) "By rejecting a conscious unity of the
psyche, Freud is obliged to imply
everywhere a magical unity linking distant
phenomena across obstacles" (pp. 94-95). In
other words, the act of repression itself is
unitary, so how can it be accomplished by
separate "minds?"
Perhaps one of the most disturbing
questions is how repression could possibly
ward off psychic pain. That is, how could
a person be saved pain by keeping
threatening information from one part of
the mind when the defending part of the
mind would have to understand the full
import of that information? Fingarette
(1969) makes a similar point and then
asks:
Once we abandon the notion that defense
brings a kind of blissful ignorance to some
'agency' of the mind, the question forces
itself upon one: Why should anxiety be
reduced by defence any more than, better
than, or differently than would be the case
if we merely curbed our impulses and/or
deceived others quite consciously? (p. 116)
A thorough consideration of the logical issues surrounding the self-deception
paradox is beyond the intent of this paper.
The interested reader is referred to
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the analyses by Fingarette (1969) and
Warner (1982). For our purposes it is
enough to show that the psychodynamic
approach is conceptually inadequate to the
task. Before closing this discussion I will
describe an approach to the self-deception
paradox that represents a substantial
advance over the psychodynamic one.
Then in the next section I will review some
approaches to similar paradoxes in contemporary cognitive psychology and show
that the explanations are strangely parallel
to the psychodynamic one and fail in
similar ways.
In his classic treatment of selfdeception, Fingarette (1969) advocates a
shift in discussing consciousness from the
language of perception to the language of
volition. He argues that the crux of the difficulty has been our characterization of
self-deception in the passive language of
perception, such as "appear" and "see:' He
proposes that we shift to a metaphor of
linquistic or paralinguistic volition, "to say"
or "to avow", emphasizing the constructual nature of consciousness. This is very
much like Polanyi's (1964, chapters 4 and
5) characterization of articulate awareness
as an achievement requiring some mental effort.
Chapter 2 of Fingarette's book is an
insightful demonstration of the difficulty
of adequately explaining self-deception. He
shows that in every case the philosophers
who have tried to explain away the
paradox have failed in one of two ways.
Either they explain it in a way that is not
paradoxical but fail to capture the
"resistance" aspect of self-deception, or
they succeed in capturing the phenomenon
only to see paradox return in a variant
form. If one "fails to notice;' no resistance
is involved, and it is simple ignorancenot self deception. One must refuse to
notice. Nor can one's refusal be
acknowledged by himself, even within is
own mind. That would be cynical lying
rather than self-deception. Self-deception
differs from lying in that a person is
genuinely surprised when and if his deception is revealed to him.
In Fingarette's volitional model he
describes consciousness as "the exercise of
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the (learned) skill of 'spelling out'
feature of the world as we are enga
it" (p. 39). His explanation of self-dec
turns on a special kind of spellin
which he calls "avowaI:' To avow is t
out something that asserts one's id
to oneself. A self-image is the prod
this kind of construction, a produ
willful action. In building a self-ima
not only use some materials, we
some. With this simile Fingarette in
to account for resistance. But, this ac
fails in both of the ways he shows th
others have failed. When he spea
avowing some things and failing to
others, he is speaking of ignorance
resistance is involved. When he spe
actively disavowing, he is dealing wi
self-deception phenomenon a
(resistance is involved), but pa
returns. He slips back and forth be
these two without acknowledgem
showing that the simile is both
paradoxical and adequate to
phenomenon of resistance. As he w
early in his book, 'There is a part
slipperiness about the object of inve
tion" (p. 13).
But there is much in Finga
account of self-deception that is usefu
proposal that he we shift from a p
vocabulary in accounting for
sciousness to an active volitional on
important advance, as is his typifi
of the mental acts involved in
deception ("spelling out" and "avow
being primarily linguistic and
inguistic. Fingarette proposes that
came to similar conclusions with r
to the linguistic nature of consciou

I have shown in detail elsewhere (
Transformation, Chapter 1) that wh
the other changes in his theoretical
over the years, Freud always was con
that language was the essence, o
intimately related· to the essenc
preconsciousness and consciousness
strongly suggests, though Freud nev
it this way, that the 'mental act' deno
'hypercathexis' is essentially a ki
linguistic or paralinguistic act. It is,
gest, much the same as what I have
'spelling out: (Fingarette, 1969, p. 1
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In the summary of "transparency
theory" in a later section of this paper, I
will expand upon this view and propose
that self-deception and even many kinds
of "mental illness" can be productively
understood as particular kinds of nonverbal assertion, that is, as types of
paralanguage. (See Brown, Warner and
Williams, 1985, for a more detailed
explanation of this view.)
The Splitting of the Psyche in
Contemporary Cognitive Psychology.
The major body of empirical work on
the unconscious has been within the
perceptual defense research tradition.
Dixon (1971) and Erdelyi (1974) argue that
the combined sum of all of this research
has firmly established the existence of
unconscious mental processes. In his
review and resuscitation of the "new look
in perception;' Erdelyi (1974) sampled over
1000 research publications on perceptual
defense and vigilance, "gargantuan proceedings" as he called them, and argued
that the disillusionment with this research
topic in the late 1950s was premature and
mistaken. He went to great lengths to meet
the methodological criticisms and to show
that even when giving the critics the
benefit of the doubt, there is still ample
evidence to establish the perceptual defense
and vigilance phenomena.
Most interesting for the thrust of this
paper is his way of dealing with what
Howie (1952, p. 311) calls "the most
serious criticism of all'e-the conceptual
one. This criticism holds that perceptual
defense cannot be established empirically
because it makes no sense conceptually-it
is paradoxical. Briefly put, the paradox is
this: in order to defend against a threatening input, the perceiver must already know
enough of its content to be intimidated.
He therefore hides from himself what he
already knows. Worse yet, he also must
hide from himself the act of hiding the
content, since the act includes his motive
or reason for hiding it. Paradoxical indeed!
This paradox is obviously a special case
of the self-deception paradox, in this case
applied to perception.
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Erdelyi's answer to the perceptual
defense version of this dilemma is to don
the mantle of the information processing
cognitivist. To an information processing
theorist there is nothing at all surprising
about parallel processors, even one called
"conscious" and another that is not conscious. Nor need anyone feel threatened
by animism in admitting unconscious processing in this day and age (Erdelyi, 1974,
pp. 3-4), since all of these supposedly purposive entities can be explained
mechanistically in terms of computer logic.
His argument closely parallels one given
a few years earlier by Dixon (1971, pp.
223-229), also a defender of the perceptual defense faith. For both theorists there
seems to be an implicit acceptance that
reduction to mechanistic entities, either in
physiological or computer logic terms,
makes the two-agent explanation acceptable. A paper by Dennett (1978) entitled
"Why the Law of Effect Will Not Go
Away" demonstrates how compelling this
kind of argument can be at its best. In this
view the artificial intelligence theorist can
proceed in his computer program to posit
agents, demons, and all kinds of animistic
entities, as long as it is remembered that
all such things will finally be reducible to
"and gates;' "or gates;' etc., in the hardware
language. The old behaviorists insisted
upon both parsimony and mechanistic
thesis. The new information processing
psychologists (closely associated with the
artificial intelligence establishment) are
content with only one-the mechanistic
thesis. They are willing to sacrifice parsimony and multiply agents as long as
those agents are ultimately reducible to
mechanistic elements.
These same kinds of phenomena
have appeared in a much more recent
tradition, one of the hot areas of the
cognitive psychology of the 70s - selective attention. The development of the
evidence and the debates are generally
known and will be only briefly alluded to
here. The controversy centers on the fate
of unattended items in a dichotic listening task: are they processed semantically
or are they somehow "filtered" from
semantic processing and rejected on the
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basis of superficial features? Some
(Deutsch and Deutsch, 1963; Lewis, 1970;
Corteen and Wood, 1972; Corteen and
Dunn, 1974; Inouye, 1975) claim to have
evidence for full semantic processing of the
unattended channel. Others (Treisman,
1964; Treisman and Geffen, 1967;
Treisman and Riley, 1969; Treisman,
Square and Green, 1974; and Treisman
and Gelade, 1980) claim that unwanted
information from the unattended channel
is rejected on the basis of features of the
input, without full semantic processing.
Dixon (1971, Chapter 10) and Erdelyi
(1974, pp. 11-12) have both recognized that
the conceptual machinery used by attention theorists is essentially equivalent to
their own accounts of perceptual defense,
and on that basis have claimed a rightful
place for perceptual defense theory in contemporary cognitive psychology. A major
thrust of Dixon's book is the question of
why the multitude of subliminal perception studies and perceptual defense studies
have been ignored and spurned by
academic psychologists while the closely
related demonstrations of selective attention have been received as some of the
most important cognitive research of the
past twenty years.
Early approaches to attention theory
(Treisman, 1964) did not involve a "two
agent" explanation, but hypothesized a
simple mechanistic filter that was preset
to reject most words in the unattended
channel while letting just a few with
lowered thresholds (such as the subject's
own name) through. This accounts for the
so-called "cocktail party phenomenon"
described by Cherry (1951) a few years
earlier in which one can be attending to
one conversation but then hear one's name
mentioned in another conversation and
immediately shift attention. Presumably
the threshold for one's own name is permanently lowered. But other more recent
evidence indicates that the filtering cannot
be a "preset" thing, but must be done on
the basis of the meaning of the inputfull semantic processing of the unattended
channel. For example, Lewis (1970)
showed that even though subjects are not
able to recognize and report the words of
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the unattended channel while "shado
(repeating back) the words of the atte
channel, still when the word coming
unattended channel was a synonym
shadowed word in the attended ch
(like "house" and "home") it slowed
the subject's reaction time in repeatin
attended word. Of course there is no
for the subject to know that the word
synonyms unless he is processing
unattended word for meaning, and
without awareness. This kind of obs
tion requires a very smart filter, one
processes meaning just as the "exec
or "central processor" does. We ar
with a kind of "dual agent" cog
model.
That these attentional theories w
eventually be pushed to posit a spl
of the psyche (comparable to the Fre
one) was anticipated early by Deutsc
Deutsch (1963):

. . . such evidence as the above w
require us, on filter theory, to postul
additional discriminative system bel
at the level of the filter, perhaps as
plex as that of the central mechani
which information was assumed
filtered.

With evidence (such as that from L
study) indicating that the "filtered"
tended information is in fact proc
semantically, we then ask what the
tral mechanism" can do that the "
can't. If, as Dixon and Erdelyi sugges
"filter" is also implicated in perce
defense, then it must have knowled
the whole personality structure of th
son in order to discriminate threat
from non-threatening inputs. What s
out in attention theory as a s
mechanistic filter is pushed by obs
tions (such as those of Lewis, 1970;
teen and Wood, 1972; Corteen and D
1974; Inouye, 1975) into becomi
system capable of dealing with me
-a second mind, a bifurcated p
reminiscent of the psychodynamic
How ironic it is that the acad
psychology that spumed the "Freudia
tions" a generation ago now posits si
entities. But they are made respectab

25

AMCAP JOURNAL / NOVEMBER 1985

the promise that they are reducible to
Boolean logic and can be modelled on a
computer. It seems acceptable to multiply
"processors" to the extent necessary to
account for the phenomena (with little
concern for elegance or parsimony) as long
as each one is ultimately explainable in
physicalistic terms.
There have been objections within
mainstream cognitive psychology to this
kind of theorizing. Neisser in a 1976 book
criticized the attentional theories of the
preceding decade, primarily on the basis
of their mechanical passivity. As he said
in the introduction to Cognition and
Reality (1976):
The last of the questions that generated this
book concerns the conceptions of attention,
capacity and consciousness. In writing
cognitive psychology a decade ago, I
deliberately avoided theorizing about consciousness. It seemed to me that psychology
was not ready to tackle the issue, and that
any attempt to do so would lead only to
philosophically naive and fumbling speculations. Unfortunately, these fears have been
realized; many current models of cognition
treat consciousness as if it were just a particular stage of processing in a mechanical
flow of information. Because I am sure that
these models are wrong, it has seemed
important to develop an alternative interpretation of the data on which they are
based ... (pp. xii-xiii)
Neisser's 1976 book was strongly
influenced by the perceptual theory of J.
J. Gibson. In his classic 1966 treatise, The
Senses Co.nsidered as Perceptual Systems,
Gibson argues that to divide human action
into discrete stimulus and response units
is much too glib. Motoric action is an
integral component in perceptual processes. Likewise, there is much perceptual
feedback needed for skillful motor action.
The passive "camera model" of perception
comes from basing theory primarily upon
visual perception. The motoric component
is much more obvious in haptic (touch)
perception. We must feel in a purposive
way in order to perceive the shape of
things. He argues that a subtler but similar
motoric initiation is present in vision. Gib-

son also opposes "atomism;' the isolation
of single stimulus (or response) units, arguing instead for an active search and sampling of an "optic array" (or auditory or
haptic array).
There is an important parallel between the way Sartre and later Fingarette
have objected to the mechanistic Freudian
way of dealing with the self-deception
paradox by splitting the psyche, and the
objections of Gibson and Neisser to similar
models in information processing
psychology. Fingarette's proposal, that
much of the problem in dealing with the
self-deception paradox can be avoided by
changing from a passive visual metaphor
to a volitional one is also parallel to Gibson's proposal for a shift to an active volitional model of perception. We will see in
what follows that this approach, when
combined with Polanyi's concept of tacit
knowledge, does indeed open the way for
a more adequate conceptualization of socalled "unconscious mental processes:' But
before considering Polanyi, we will
examine one other place these phenomena
have been studied within psychology.
Self Deception in Social Psychology.
Self-deception and related phenomena
have also been studied within the field of
social psychology but under other names.
"Cognitive dissonance" (Festinger, 1957) is
obviously related to self-deception theory.
One of the typical experiments (Festinger
and Carlsmith, 1959) is to have subjects
perform a very boring task such as turning over spools for half an hour then paying them either one dollar or ten dollars
to convince incoming subjects that it is an
interesting task. Contrary to behavioristic
predictions, the subjects who are reinforced less, the one-dollar subjects,
actually come to believe their own
statements, that the task was interesting,
more than the ten-dollar subjects, the ones
who are reinforced more. The usual
explanation is that the ten-dollar subjects have adequate explanation for why
they would deceive incoming subjects,
but that the one-dollar subjects must
do some rationalizing to "reduce the
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dissonance" by convincing themselves that
it really was an interesting task.
The phenomenon would be better
titled "moral dissonance;' since it is more
than just a contradiction within the subjects' beliefs. Their supposed collusion with
the experimenter in misleading incoming
subjects (while actually being deceived by
the experimenter) is an indictment of their
integrity. But the usual way of discussing
the findings is to argue that whenever a
person holds beliefs that contradict one
another, that person will be motivated to
alter one or the other of the beliefs to
restore balance to the cognitive system. I
propose that when the dissonance is only
cognitive, involving no moral culpability
on the part of subjects, the effects would
be quite different, and for that reason
"moral dissonance" or "ethical dissonance"
would be more apt terms for the
phenomenon than "cognitive dissonance".
I further argue that the phenomenon could
even better be given Sartre's familiar term
of mauviase foi, or self-deception.
In the era when cognitive dissonance
theory was invented there was much less
concern about experimenter ethics. The
paradigm is a curious one for many
reasons. The experimenter deceives subjects in order to catch them in a selfdeception. In order for the study to "work;'
the subjects must be deceived about the
true purpose of their participation. The
most interesting thing about this whole
line of experimentation is that the
cognitive dissonance theorists do not mention or seem to notice the paradoxical
nature of their subjects' actions. Certainly
at some point in time the subjects noticed
that the task was boring. What could they
possibly say to themselves to later be convinced otherwise? And even if they could
somehow successfully "repress" the contradiction, would they not also have to
repress the repressive act, to an infinite
regress?
A few years ago Cur and Sackheim
(1979) published a paper entitled "SelfDeception: A Concept in Search of a
Phenomenon" in which they set as their
task to give adequate empirical evidence
to support the self-deception concept as it
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exists in the philosophical literature
I would argue that there has been ade
empirical precedent for the concep
some time now, even in some of the
major traditions of cognitive and
psychology. What is still missing i
psychological literature is a noncontr
tory theoretical treatment of
phenomenon.
It is curious to note that alth
Festinger did not discuss his "forced
pliance" studies in terms of their rele
for the concept of unconscious menta
cesses, later investigators in that res
tradition did. Festinger accounted fo
findings in terms of "dissonance"
aversive motivational state that the
son will seek to reduce. But Bem (
argued that the hypothesized drive w
unnecessary one, that all of the fin
could be explained more simply in
of environmental contingencies. He m
tained that the person observes his
actions and then attributes cognitiv
emotional states to himself just a
would in explaining the actions o
observed other. In several simple st
he demonstrated a very obvious thing
only will a person believe his own
ment more when paid less for givi
but a second person observer will
believe the person more when he see
the person was paid less for saying
But it was not Bem who saw
implications of his work for uncons
mental processes. In a 1977 Psycholo
Review paper entitled 'Telling More
We Can Know: Verbal Reports on
tal Processes", Nisbett and Wilson p
up on Bern's point (that we have no p
access to the causes for our own ac
but rather infer those causes from
observations of those actions, just
would do in explaining the behavi
another person). In the intervenin
years between Bem's 1967 psycholo
Review paper and Nisbett and Wi
1977 one, Tversky and Kahneman's (
demonstration of the irrationality of
sion making under uncertainty be
well-known and Kelly's attribution t
(1967, 1972) called attention to at
tional bias in social judgment. The
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against accurate introspection of one's
mental processes was growing. Nisbett and
Wilson (1977) reviewed a number of
studies in the cognitive dissonance tradition, the learning-without-awareness
literature, helping behavior research, and
other areas - all demonstrating that people are not aware of the processes and
reasons underlying their judgments.
Altogether, they give impressive evidence
for Mandler's (1975, p. 241) statement that
the "analysis of situations and appraisal of
the environment ... goes on mainly at
the nonconscious levet'
Nisbett and Wilson are aware that the
studies they review converge with the
subliminal-perception/perceptual-defense
research. They give a brief summary of
that literature and comment (p. 239) that
Dixon and Erdelyi were successful in
obtaining a new acceptance for perceptual
defense phenomena on the grounds of
convergence with the selective attention
and filtering research. They also mention
the logical paradox problem of this
literature, but like Dixon and Erdelyi they
erroneously conclude that an information
processing account resolves the paradox
(see p. 24). The computer metaphor is a
seductive one. Somehow it seems that if
a computer "filters out" threatening information that we don't have to worry about
how it could have been recognized as
threatening without it first being received.
Actually there are two paradoxes here, one
having to do with perceiving below the
threshold of perception (and it will not be
easily dismissed by saying the person
perceived it but forgot, as Nisbett and
Wilson'do on page 240), and the second
having to do with resistance. Subliminal
perception involves only the first, but
perceptual defense involves both.
Before outlining an alternative way
of dealing with these phenomena and
these paradoxes, it may be helpful to
examine the relationship between the concepts of subliminal perception, perceptual
defense and self-deception.
A Comparison of Concepts.
Dixon's (1971) book not only reviews
the perceptual defense and vigilance
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literature but the more general topic of all
subliminal perception. Perceptual defense
is a type of subliminal perception, but a
special type that involves not only
subliminal perception but also something
akin to the clinical phenomenon of
resistance. Subliminal perception simply
involves perceiving "signals" that are below
the usual threshold of perception. But
perceptual defense involves a kind of
refusal. Threatening information is not
perceived even though neutral information
at the same "amplitude" can be perceived.
We can view perceptual defense, then, as
a special case of subliminal perception. It
is subliminal perception (of the threatening nature of the input) plus resistance. It
involves refusing to perceive, but this
refusal must be based upon some
knowledge (ostensibly subliminally
perceived) of the threatening nature of the
input. It is also, then, a special case of the
self deception paradox. The person must
in some way know the information in
order to refuse to learn it.
Figure 1 is given to clarify the relationship of four concepts: (1) unconscious
processing (or as we prefer to call it "tacit
knowledge and action"), (2) subliminal
perception, (3) self-deception and (4)
perceptual defense and vigilance. Many
philosophers have made the point that
terms such as these are "theory laden:'
That is, the terms themselves contain more
than a description of the phenomena, they
'buy into" a particular way of explaining
those phenomena. In proposing an alternative theory, it is a difficult choice between using the old terms in order to have
continuity with previous literature or
choosing new ones that express the alternative explanation. I have stayed with the
terms "subliminal perception" and "selfdeception" to keep continuity with
previous work (even though those terms
don't adequately reflect how I view the
phenomena), and I have also kept the term
"perceptual defense;' but I have abandoned
the term "unconscious processing" (in favor
of "tacit knowledge and action") because
it is too far from the way I will explain
such phenomena. The meaning of the
term "tacit" will become more clear as we
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examine Polanyi's philosophy in what
follows.
Figure 1 is meant to show that the
self-deception phenomenon is a special
case of tacit knowledge and action. That
is, to account for it we will first have to
have an adequate general theory of tacit
knowledge and action. The concept of selfdeception involves tacit knowledge, but it
also involves resistance.
Subliminal perception can also be

considered to depend upon an adeq
theory of tacit knowledge and actio
deals with the application of such a th
to the process of perception. Perce
defense also deals with tacit percep
but tacit perception where resistan
involved. In that way it can be thoug
as a special case of subliminal perce
(subliminal perception plus resistance)
also as a special case of self-deception
perceptual manifestation of self-decep

the pre-attentive processing paradox
I
the resistance paradox
I

the general
phenomenon of
tacit knowledge
and action

perceptual
defense
applied to
perception

Figure 1. The relationship of the concepts of tacit knowledge and action, self deception,
subliminal perception and perceptual defense to one another and to the two paradoxes.
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Neisser and Gibson have both been
resistant to the perceptual defense
phenomenon. Given the confused way it
has been treated in the psychological
literature, that is probably to their credit.
But it can be shown that phenomena that
both of them acknowledge as bona fide
involve the very same paradoxes. Gibson
(1966) in his influential theoretical account
of perception makes a brief allusion to
these issues in a section entitled 'The Muddle of Subliminal Perception:' He says,
Certain experiments purported to show that
an observer could perceive meanings or
suggestions unconsciously, or could
discriminate them without awareness of the
sensory difference between them. This
seemed to imply unconscious defense
mechanisms governing perception as well
as motivated behavior-wishful perceiving.
But to say that one can perceive in order
not to perceive is a logical contradiction.
Something is wrong somewhere. (p. 291)
It is clear from this quote that Gibson did not see a distinction between the
subliminal perception hypothesis and the
more restrictive hypothesis of perceptual
defense.
Neisser in his 1967 book on cognitive
psychology also gives perceptual defense
short shrift and is roundly criticized by
Dixon (1971) for ignoring the mass of
evidence for the phenomenon. In his 1976
book, Cognition and Reality, which is
based in large measure on Gibson's work,
he avoids the issue altogether, except as his
discussion of attention in Chapter 5 is relevant to the same issues. Neisser and Gibson are certainly justified in rejecting the
conceptual muddle of the subliminal
perception literature, but curiously,
Neisser's own account of "preattentive processing" in his 1967 book involves the same
logical contradiction that underlies
accounts of subliminal perception. He proposes a rapid kind of pre-processing in
perception that is used to decide whether
a more detailed "figural synthesis" is in
order. But how could such a decision be
made without knowing the content of
what is to be perceived, and if it is already

known, what could further processing
accomplish?
Actually what I am discussing here
is not just one paradox, but two. The first
and the easiest to resolve is the paradox
of tacit knowledge and action and the
special case of it called "subliminal perception:' In this paper a resolution will be proposed to this paradox in terms of
"transparency theory;' a view that draws
upon Polanyi's philosophy of tacit
knowledge, Gibson's view of the nature of
perception and findings of contemporary
psychophysics.
The second and more difficult
paradox is that of self-deception and its
special case in the perceptual domain,
"perceptual defense:' This paradox is a
more difficult one to explain and the
phenomenon is a more complex one, for
it involves all that we encounter in a
general theory of tacit knowledge and
action, plus one other thing-the
phenomenon of resistance. Although there
will be some suggestions about this
paradox in what follows, an explanation
of the resolution of this paradox will not
be attempted in this paper. The interested
reader is referred to Warner (1982), and
also to the outline of some of his
arguments that appears in the chapter by
Brown, Warner and Williams (1985).
Polanyi's Two Kinds of Knowing.
In his classic philosophy of science
book, Personal Knowledge, Michael
Polanyi (1962) wrote two brief but profound chapters on cognitive theory
(Chapters 4 and 5). The work has insights
into the subtleties of human cognition that
far surpass the current work in information processing. His approach has much
in common with Gestalt psychology, but
he explains more than perception, and his
view of man is more telelogical than the
Gestalt one.
One of his most important explanations concerns the two kinds of knowing:
tacit and explicit. It may seem unusual that
one would propose cognitive theory in a
philosophy of science book, but his intention seems to be to show the limits of
scientific knowledge. Science deals with
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explicit knowledge. The business of science
is to produce knowledge that can be
specified, verbally transmitted and
publically verified. But that is not the only
kind of knowledge that is of value to a
culture. Indeed, even the art of science
itself, the way in which effective science
is conducted, is not specifiable but must
be learned by apprenticeship.
To clarify what is meant by tacit
knowing, he gives the example of the
crafts of medieval Europe. The half literate
Stradivarius created violins superior to
anything that can be produced today,
despite our technological advances. Yet one
who has this skill would never be able to
put it into words. It can only be learned
by apprenticeship. For that reason many
of the most valued crafts of the past have
been forever lost. Similarly, in British
Common Law the decision of the judge
is often of greater value than any reasons
he can give for that decision, for the actual
reasons are assumed to be subtle and
unspecifiable. This kind of "unconscious;'
if we wish to still call it by that name, is
much different than the kind proposed by
psychodynamic theory. Whereas the
psychodynamic
unconscious
is
hypothesized to consist of primitive and
irrational urges that must be tempered by
the rational ego, the kind of "unconscious"
we are here describing is in a sense much
higher and more rational than our
specifiable knowledge, or "conscious" mental life.
This kind of unspecifiability is related
to what one has in mind when saying, "I
have a clear idea, but I just can't put it into
words:' Polanyi expressed it succinctly
with his maxim, 'We know more than we
can say:' We could refer to this first way
knowledge can be unspecifiable as ineffability. Polanyi (1962, p. 56) discusses a
second way knowledge can be
unspecifiable, which he refers to as
logically unspecifiable. As an example of
this he points out that a skilled pianist
could certainly identify each of the chords
that he plays in a given piece, but may not
be able to do it, even to himself, while still
playing. In other words, he can focus on
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the whole performance or on a part
not on both at the same time.
There are, then, two ways tha
own thoughts, precepts or actions m
unspecifiable to us. They may be inef
or they may be logically unspecifiable
concept of something being log
unspecifiable is explained in terms o
kinds of awareness: focal awareness
subsidiary awareness. In order fo
pianist's performance to proceed smoo
he must focus on the totality, the G
of the piece, as he proceeds, with the
ticulars being relegated to subsi
awareness. If he were to focus too int
upon any part, the performance w
falter, the sense of context would f
When a skilled carpenter hamm
nail (p. 55), he is aware of both the
mer and the nail, but in different w
He attends through the hammer to
nail. The hammer becomes like an e
sion of his body, such that he doesn't
on the feelings of the hammer again
palm, but focuses through them to
contact of the hammer with the nail
contact of the hammer against the n
in focal awareness and he is subsid
aware of the feelings of the ham
against his hand. The nail is the obje
his attention but the hammer is an in
ment of attention.
Polanyi's description of langua
these terms (p. 57) is particularly insig
When we read, words become instrum
of attention with the underlying mea
as the object of our attention. If we
instead on the individual words, w
to get the apprehension of the who
is thus possible to read too slowly. W
identify every word separately, but
is no coherence to the whole, and w
over it and over it without comprehen
In Polanyi's words, "all particulars be
meaningless if we lose sight of the pa
which they jointly constitute:'
He refers to this as "the transpar
of language" and describes it in this

My correspondence arrives at my brea
table in various languages, but my
understands only English. Having
finished reading a letter I may wish to
it on to him, but must check mysel
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look again to see in what language it was
written. I am vividly aware of the meaning conveyed by the letter, yet know
nothing whatever of its words. I have
attended to them closely but only for what
they mean and not for what they are as
objects. If my understanding of the text
were halting, or its expressions or its spellings were faulty, its words would arrest my
attention. They would become slightly opaque and prevent my thought from passing
through them unhindered to the things they
signify. (p. 57)
I have briefly summarized five concepts in Polanyi's account of cognition:
(1) two kinds of knowledge-tacit
and explicit
(2) two ways knowledge is
unspecifiable-ineffable and logically
unspecifiable
(3) two kinds of awareness-focal
and subsidiary
(4) two ways we attend-to objects
of attention and through instruments of
attention
(5) the transparency of language
I will now incorporate these concepts,
together with some insights from Gibson's
theory of perception and some recent findings in psychophysics, to propose an alternative account of "unconscious mental
processes:'

The Rudiments of Transparency
Theory
Up to this point in this paper I have
detaikd what I think is perhaps the single
most important unresolved matter in
psychology-the phenomenon referred to
as "unconscious mental processes:' I prefer
to refer to it as "tacit knowledge and
action:' It is, as recognized by the "new
look in perception" theorists of the 1950s,
the issue that brings together areas of
psychology as diverse as psychophysics
and psychodynamic theory. It extends to
the central problems of attention theory
in cognitive psychology, to recent directions in social psychology having to do
with how we judge the actions of ourselves
and others, and to the philosophical
literature on self-deception. There are
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many manifestations and many aspects of
this problem as diagrammed in Figure 1.
In what remains I will outline a
general approach to psychology which we
have called "transparency theory" (Brown
& Williams, 1983; Brown, Warner &
Williams, 1985; Brown, 1986) after
Polanyi's discussion of the "transparency
of language:' The theory has applications
to perceptual and cognitive psychology
generally, as well as fields as diverse as
clinical psychology and second language
acquisition theory.
To adequately explain the theory and
its relationship to the theorists mentioned
above would require a number of papers
longer than this one. It will be sufficient
for my purposes to summarize seven
major premises of the theory in contrast
to the traditionally received views within
psychology (as shown in Table 1, page 31)
and briefly explain each.
The first "received" premise to be
challenged is the assumption of "atomism;'
the proposition that the entire sensory
array consists of discrete stimulus units and
that human action can be understood in
terms of discrete response units. It is
interesting to note that Charles Taylor has
shown in his very influential philosophical
treatise The Explanation of Behavior,
1964, that teleological explanations of
behavior are only circular when one
assumes atomism. We are arguing that it
is this same fallacious assumption that
makes "multiple processor" models appear
necessary in accounting for the results of
"subliminal perception" studies. We propose that every demonstration of the
existence of "unconscious mental processes"
or "subliminal perception" rests upon this
assumption.
If this can indeed be demonstrated,
we have another profound irony. Whereas
the thousands of studies of subliminal
perception and perceptual defense in the
"new look" tradition were intended to
empirically verify and defend the concept
of an unconscious against behaviorist
skepticism, those very demonstrations
only have force as arguments of
unconscious mental processes if one
assumes atomism. That is, the empirical
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Table 1. The premises of transparency theory in contrast to the received view.

Seven Received Premises:

Seven Premises of Transparency Theor

1. Sensory input can be considered as discrete
stimulus units and behavior can be considered
as discrete response units. (Atomism)

1. We do not see or hear discrete "sni
but we intentionally draw information
the "optic array;' "auditory array;' etc. H
action is also a patterned whole. Ou
damental mode of perception and act
tacit. (Tacit Holism)

2. Information below the usual threshold level
is processed unconsciously. (Subliminal
Perception)

2. There are not sensory thresholds. Det
of a weak stimulus is rather a contin
Every quantum of light is "percieved
every minute change in amplitude of s
(Signal Detection Theory)
There are discontinuities in perc
that can be mistaken for sensory thres
but they are predictable from tempora
spatial context and the personality and em
state of the person. They can be used a
rors of cognitive style.

3. Perception is determined by the sensory
input altered by past experience or learned
biases. (Naive Realism)

3. Our purposes are reflected in our p
tions. Perceptions are also responses, an
will. (Constructive Alternativism)

4. Behavior is caused by or altered by
physiologically determined emotional reactions. (Psychologism)

4. Much of what passes for emotion is
like a nonverbal language by which we a
blame and assert. At least some emot
therefore a response, and act of
(Agentivism)

5. There are separate information processing

5. Every change in the Gestalt is perceive
parts are not noticed without mental
which takes time. (Physiognomic Perce

systems for cognition and emotion. The emotional system is faster. (Fragmentation of the
Psyche)
6. Dichotic listening studies have had important implications for attentional theory.
Although the subject is not aware of what is
said in the unattended channel, there is
evidence that at least some kinds of information can get through. This is usually explained
in terms of a filter that lets some things
through and blocks others. (Fragmentation of
the Psyche)

6. Active perception makes some aspects
sensory array "ground" rather than "f
The "figure" is in focal awareness an
"ground" is in subsidiary awareness. A c
in the ground will alter the percept
whole, but perhaps not be noticed as a
That would require attention and m
work. In the artificial situation of di
listening, time constraints preclude arti
awareness of the unattended channel but
an effect on the whole. (Tacit Holism)

7. We think we know the reasons for our
actions, but it is illusory. Contingencies determine our choices and we give ourselves
rational reasons for why we made them.
(Implicit in this view is the premise that intentional action must be introspect able,
articulately specifiable.) (Epiphenomenalism)

7. Most intentional action is tacit
articulate nor articulable. To introspect
we have done or why we have done it re
mental work of a kind that we seldom d
even when we do it, our explanation
always be inadequate for the same reason
we cannot adequately explain any
performance-such
knowledge
unspecifiable. But that does not mean th
action was not agentive and intention
that it was caused by environmenta
straints. (Tacit Holism and Agentivism
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demonstrations and arguments only have
force from within a behavioristic (or other
atomistic) framework. As soon as one
gives up on this assumption of atomism,
then a divided psyche or a second mind
or an "unconscious" is not needed to
explain the observations.
The major opponent of atomism
within mainstream academic psychology
is Gibson (1966). In a paper dealing with
Gibson's "ecological optics" theory, Neisser
(1977) argues that the revolutionary nature
of Gibson's idea has not been fully
appreciated, that ''his innocent-sounding
suggestion that we make a new description of the stimulus would render that
whole century of theory obsolete" (p. 17).
It seems natural enough, he continues, for
psychologists to first consider the simplest
experimental situation, a single stimulus
and response. He goes on to show that in
the case of perception (as well as the learning of nonsense syllables and animal conditioning) the strategy has backfired in that
the unnatural and impoverished "punctate
stimulus" situation has led to unnecessarily
complex perceptual theory.
In a parallel way we propose that if
one begins by assuming atomism, it will
necessarily follow that he will eventually
be pushed by empirical demonstrations to
posit something like an unconscious component to the mind, or a filter. It will be
necessary to in some way fragment the
psyche. He will then conclude that there
is adequate empirical evidence for
"unconscious mental processes" when that
construct is in fact an artifact of the
atomist assumption.
But we will begin in another way,
siding with Gibson that perception
involves active "information pick-up" from
a total optic array (or auditory array, etc.)
with the apprehension of parts requiring
mental work. This last statement is really
a combining of Gibson's holistic theory of
perception with Polanyi's account of focal
vs. subsidiary awareness. We propose that
most of what we perceive at anyone time
is in the background, tacitly apprehended
in the service of some other focal goal. For
example, in driving a car we focus on only
certain parts of the optic array, most of
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what we "see" becomes subsidiary
background. We will refer to this premise
as tacit holism.
The second of the received premises,
the hypothesis of subliminal perception,
is not only a contradiction in terms
("perception below the lower limit of
perception"), but it is based on a
psychophysical concept, the threshold,
which no longer has adequate empirical
support. One of the major contributions
of contemporary psychophysics in the
1950s and 1960s was to quantify the step
function hypothesis of threshold theory
(the "two-state" model which proposes a
point of discontinuity at which we begin
to hear, see, etc.) and the opposing continuous function hypothesis of signal
detection theory (the "multistate" model
which proposes a continuum of detection
from "no signal" up through increasing
magnitudes of signal). The psychophysical
functions for these two models are shown
in Figure 2, page 34. The signal detection
theorists (Tanner and Swets, 1954; Swets,
Tanner and Birdsall, 1961; Green and
Swets, 1966) demonstrated that the "twostate" model gives rise to an ROC curve
("receiver operating characteristic curve")
that has two facets with inflection at the
"ideal" decision point, while the multistate
model gives rise to a smooth continuous
ROC curve (which is under certain conditions an "isosensitivity" curve). They
found no perceptual data that would fit
the two-state ROC curve, but rather all
that they tested fit the muItistate continuous curve. In other words when the
threshold model is made mathematically
precise in this way, there are no data to
support it.
In a classic study of the minimum
amount of light necessary to be detected,
Hecht, Shlaer and Perinne (1942)
demonstrated that ten quanta absorbed by
the retina are sufficient for detection. In
a recent update of this work in terms of
signal detection theory, Sackett (1971,
1974) has demonstrated that retinal
absorption of a single quantum is sufficient for detection to take place. Actually
this could have been anticipated from the
signal detection theory demonstration that
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Figure 2. A comparison of the step function of threshold theory with the ogive functi
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Figure 3. The cusp catastrophe as the general case incorporating both the multistate mo
and the threshold model.
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there is no psychophysical evidence for a
threshold. If detection of a weak stimulus
is a continuous function of amplitude
rather than the step function posited by
threshold theory, any increase is enough
to be detected given enough signal and
noise trials. It becomes a statistical problem of probability to show detection of
a weak stimulus rather than a perceptual
one.
But the classical psychophysicists had
good reason to take the concept of a
threshold seriously. When one arranges
weak stimuli in an ascending or descending series (the method of limits), it subjectively seems that there is a point of
discontinuity, a place where the present
stimulus seems noticeably louder than the
ones before, even though the series are
equidistant in amplitude. The ascending
series has a different "threshoH' or point
of discontinuity than the descending series.
For years psychophysicists have just
averaged these, but the distance between
the two is in fact much more interesting
than their average. Using a threedimensional model called the "cusp;' one
of the seven fundamental surfaces in
Thom's (1975) topological system that is
called Catastrophe Theory, Inouye (1978)
has demonstrated that the distance between the ascending discontinuity (or
"catastrophe" as Thom calls them) and the
descending one is much different for
schizophrenics than for normals. Earlier
psychophysical studies of schizophrenia
had failed in the expectation that
schizophrenic thresholds would differ from
normal, but with the Catastrophe Theory
approach Inouye has shown that
schizophrenics do differ psychophysically
from normals. They perseverate more. The
distance between their ascending and
descending points of discontinuity is
greater. It has also been demonstrated that
a normal person under stress has a greater
interpoint distance than when not under
stress.
The cusp catastrophe is nothing more
than a three dimensional surface with an
ogive '1azy S" curve at one end and a 'hard
S" at the other as shown in Figure 3, page
36. It is geometrically the general case of
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which both the threshold model and the
continuity model (shown in Figure 2) are
special cases. The continuity model is, of
course, identical with the lazy S end of the
surface, and the hard S end has two
thresholds, one as one ascends from left
to right (as shown in Figure 3) and one
as one descends from right to left. The
'high stress" function (a cross section from
the surface) shown in Figure 3 is
characteristic of schizophrenics and the
'1ow stress" function (the second crosssection behind the first in Figure 3) is
characteristic of normals.
We amend our position, then, to say
that there is a threshold (or rather multiple thresholds), but it is cognitive rather
than sensory. Thresholds are a mirror of
emotive state and cognitive style. What
has been discovered is no more than an
example of the complementary perceptual
processes of assimilation and contrast put
forth years ago by the Gestalt
psychologists, but this time with a
topological way of predicting when
assimilation (not noticing a difference) will
occur, and when contrast (exaggerating a
difference) will occur. And it becomes a
useful index of personality and
psychological state.
Gibson has made a profound contribution in providing the concepts to
begin the work of a holistic analysis of
perception, but it is not altogether clear
how to turn his concepts into experiments.
The topological surfaces of Catastrophe
Theory provide a way of making precise
predictions about the ways in which
judgments are predictable from spatial and
temporal context. They are qualitatively
precise parables, or "canonical forms" that
can be directly tested in perception research
as well as in person perception from voice
research (as outlined by Brown, Warner
& Williams, 1985).
Our objection to the third received
premise which we have pejoratively referred to as "naive realism" is in one way
parallel to Gibson's objection. He also has
rejected the traditional typification of
perception as "sensation colored by conception or past experience:' But our proposed alternative premise is one of the
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places where we most differ from Gibson
and from Neisser. Gibson does move us
forward from "information processing" (as
though information were pushed through
us) to "information pickup" (an active
selecting perceiver), but he doesn't specify
how it happens. As Hamlyn (1977) has
pointed out, although Gibson moves in the
direction of active holistic perception, he
finally leaves the self, the agent, the
perceiver out of perception. In his description of information pickup he claims that
the senses functioning as perceptual
systems "can obtain information about
objects in the world without the intervention of an intellectual process" (Hamlyn,
1977, p. 13). This leaves one hard pressed
to extrapolate Gibson's theory to abnormal psychology. He deals only with
veridical perception, certainly not that
which is "pathologicaI:' Neisser (1976) also
admits the Piagetian concept of a perceptual process of accommodation (altering
schemata to fit incoming information), but
not the complementary process of
assimilation (altering incoming information to make it fit preexisting schemata),
and is also therefore not able to account
for pathological perception.
But the alternative premise that we
offer is much more radical than just
including Piaget's concept of assimilation.
We are not proposing that the person's
perceptions are al tered according to
existing intentions, beliefs, etc., but that
they are acquired in the first place in a
form that reflects intentions, beliefs, etc.
That is, we are proposing that our perceptions are a reflection of personality and
that they are an act of will, every bit as
much a response as an input. We are
agreeing with Gibson in rejecting the view
that perceptions are just sensations colored
by past experience and bias, but we differ from him in our insistence that the particular information that will be picked up
and even the way it is experienced will be
different for different persons, it is a reflection of intention, personality, and cognitive
style. The perceptual or sensory experience
in its rawest form is already an expression
of the person and the person's state as

AMCAP JOURNAL / NOVEMBE

demonstrated by Inouye (1978) i
psychophysical studies referred to a
Although this is a radical prop
is not without precedent in the clinic
philosophical literature. A numb
theorists (Kelly, 1955; Rychlak, 19
466; Warner, 1982) have also pro
that we can choose to construe ou
cumstances in a number of ways
structive alternativism;' Kelly calle
and much else will be determined b
particular choice. Kelly's personalit
the REP test, is based upon the pr
that we can best understand a pers
understanding how he views sign
others. This kind of perception, th
a person perceives another person, is
highest level of what could be refer
as perception, whereas the psychoph
demonstration is at the lowest, but w
proposing that at both levels
everything in between the person a
intentions are written upon the w
perceives. We see things as we are,
they are.
The fourth premise of transpa
theory is somewhat like the third. W
proposing that many emotions,
perceptions, can productively be
sidered as response rather than a ca
response. The psychologistic view of
tions has them as biologically based
tions that cause behavior: "His
caused him to do it:' Although w
concede that many emotions, such a
or grief, are very much towar
automatic reactive side and have a s
biological basis, others like ange
depression can be better understoo
kind of intentional nonverbal me
Anger can accomplish a number of t
It can be an effective way of acc
another since it is an intentional me
that poses as involuntary (Warner, 1
And, as Solomon (1977, p. 284
argued, "anger is a great equalizer,
ing one's ari~J.gonist as an equal.
angry with a child is to treat him
adult ... to be angry with a supe
to raise yourself to his leveI:' Lik
depression can have instrumental
This approach to the emotions can
important implications for nonv
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communication research (Brown, Warner
& Williams, 1985).
The fragmentation of the psyche by
the "information processing" psychologists
had become quite complete by the 1980s.
Not only do they posit conscious and
unconscious processors, but also separate
systems for· cognition and affect, and
evidence has it that the affective system
is faster (Zajonc, 1980). We propose that
the same results can be explained alternatively in terms of a part/whole distinction and that what Zajonc has
demonstrated is that the most primitive
and fundamental kind of perception is
holistic, that it takes mental work to notice
parts (premise 5).
The Gestalt psychologists noticed this
phenomenon long ago and referred to it
as "physiognomic perception:' The basic
idea is that we do not look at a face and
notice the glaring eyes, the grinding teeth,
the red flush and conclude that the person is angry, but rather the impression of
anger is immediate and unmediated and
the component parts are only noticed
afterward if at all. 'We must assume that
features like 'threatening' or 'tempting' are
more primitive and more elementary contents of perception than those we learn of
as 'elements' in the textbooks of
psychology" (Koffka, 1928, p. 150).
Likewise, the statistician Chernoff (1973)
has shown that complex multivariate data
can be apprehended much more quickly
in the form of stylized human faces than
in traditional graphs. The Gestalt of a
human face has an immediate, tacit meaning that precedes any notice of parts.
Rather than positing a fast emotionprocessing system and a slow cognitive
one, the empirical evidence can be
explained by saying that perception is
essentially tacit and holistic and that
explicit notice of elements and parts
requires mental work. In a recent voice
study Feldstein and Bond (1981)
demonstrated that when subjects are given
the task of judging the speech rate of
voices that are in fact equivalent in rate
but vary in terms of frequency and intensity, they will judge higher frequency voices
to be faster and higher intensity voices also
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to be faster. (See also Bond and Feldstein,
1982.) But we would argue that judging
rate or intensity or any other single feature
of voice is not a very natural thing for a
person. The impression from voice is much
more global. When pressed for a judgment
we can make it, but the dimension we
think we are judging may not at all be the
one the experimenter is varying. Such
attention to a part requires mental work,
but it will not be very accurate without
practice and feedback.
We are now ready to deal with the
contradictory results of the dichotic listening studies (premise 6). Whereas Treisman
(1964) provides evidence that the subject
cannot even accurately identify the
language in which the unattended words
are spoken, Lewis (1970) gives evidence of
full semantic processing of the unattended
channel. The two seem contradictory, but
this is exactly what Polanyi would expect
on the basis of this concept of the
transparency of language. It is not
necessary to notice words or even the
language identity of the words to have an
apprehension of the meaning. Skilled
reading involves attending through the
words (the instruments of attention) to the
meaning (the object of attention). (See
Brown, Inouye, Barrus and Hansen, 1981.)
In the Lewis (1970) study, the subject
is not able to identify specific words from
the unattended channel (they are not in
focal awareness) but rather it is shown that
synonyms slow down his reaction time.
In an atomistic analysis of the situation the
results are mysterious. We have evidence
of a stimulus affecting the person's
response without the usual awareness of
having been perceived-presumably it was
processed unconsciously. In a holistic
analysis it is simple-an unnoticed part
can alter the apprehension of the whole.
The fragmentation of the psyche into conscious and unconscious processes is a
natural result of considering perception in
terms of discrete stimuli rather than a patterned whole.
One can argue that the whole
cognitive psychology enterprise called
"attention theory" is a way of patching up
the mistaken premises of 50 years of
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behaviorism. As Kahneman (1973, p. 2)
has confessed, "Indeed, the main function
of the term 'attention' in post-behavioristic
psychology is to provide a label for some
of the internal mechanisms that determine
the significance of stimuli and thereby
make it impossible to predict behavior by
stimulus considerations alone:'
Likewise, we need not conclude from
the evidence reviewed by Nisbett and
Wilson (1977) that because our attributions of reasons for our choices and
actions are in error, that the actions are
in some way "caused by behavioral contingencies" or are otherwise nonintentional
(premise 7). Most intentional action is
tacit. To try to articulate what we have
done or why we have done it requires
mental work, but will always be
inadequate.
Consider a misunderstanding between a husband and wife. Usually the two
will not agree afterward as to what caused
it, what part each played, and in general
what happened. A great deal of what happens is tacit and involves nonverbal communication. Even if the couple agree as to
what happened, their agreement and their
description will have a strong note of
arbitrariness to it. An interpersonal occurrence of that kind is a very subtle thing,
only a small part of which can be summarized with words. To summarize it
requires mental work, and there are many
such possible summaries, each distorting
or missing much of what really happened
even as it clarifies. So also, any person's
description of himself or even of another
person is an attempt to put what is essentially global and tacitly experienced into
a package of a few words. Even an
insightful characterization will distort and
fall far short even as it may capture a part
in explicit language.

Summary.
In this paper I have reviewed some
of the objections to the psychodynamic
model from the existentialist philosophers
and argued that they have adequately
demonstrated that the psychodynamic
explanation of repression fails on logical
grounds. I have also tried to show that
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many contemporary cognitive and
psychological models are also based
two-agent or split-psyche form of ex
tion and can be faulted for the
reasons. Like the psychodynamic m
they also lead to paradox, and of c
it makes no sense to look for emp
confirmation of a theory or model
logically contradictory. In the last p
this paper I have outlined an alter
account of the empirical findings th
often used as evidence for uncons
mental processes. I closed the pap
spelling out seven premises of
approach in contrast to the received
Sometimes even after I have giv
contrasts between "them" and "us" th
displayed in Table 1, someone asks
transparency theory approach is
anything more than exchanging the
"tacit vs. explicit" for "unconscious vs
scious:' In summary I will mention
major differences between
transparency theory view and the
rently received view in cogn
psychology:

(1) The information processing view
the psychodynamic one in that it in
a split psyche, two agents in the he
course they do not describe it in
terms, for they are using a com
metaphor and talking about "proce
But once all of the evidence is in, the
must have all of the discriminative p
ties of the "central processor'; the con
mind. They have in effect a two
model. Our explanation involves on
agent and explains the "noncons
nature of some inputs in terms of the
ture of the act being carried out by th
son rather than bifurcating the min
a conscious component and a
conscious component.
(2) The received view in cognitive s
considers "processing without awaren
be some kind of discovery or anomal
the usual case being explicit awaren
and a veridical registering of all th
perceives. This is, of course, also t
psychodynamic theory: the Unconsc
viewed as some kind of major sci
discovery that waited for the dawn
the twentieth century. It comes as

of revelation to modern man that there is
much more lurking in the depths of his
mind than he had ever supposed. But we
argue that the Unconscious is an artifact of
mistaken assumptions rather than a
discovery. It is a product of misreading the
nature of resistance in the primary clinical
observations. Likewise, the empirical
demonstrations of unconscious mental processes are an artifact of assuming atomism.
In contrast, transparency theory holds that
our primary mode of perception is tacit and
holistic, such that it requires some mental
work to notice components of the perceptual Gestalt or to make them explicit.
Apologists sometimes use eye-blinking,
breathing, or heart beating as evidence for
the existence of unconscious processes. But
that is using the word too broadly. One certainly wouldn't credit Freud with discovering that kind of unconscious process.
(3) If one wishes to refer to Polanyi's concept of tacit knowledge as "unconscious" it
must be recognized that it is a very different
kind than what Freud describes. The Freudian one is primitive and irrational, the
"pleasure principle" rather than the "reality
principle:' But Polanyi describes tacit
knowledge as super-rational, much subtler
and wiser than that which we can make
explicit. Indeed he characterizes the great
challenge of science as seeking to make
explicit more and more of the wisdom of
tacit apprehension and the subtleties of
skilled performances.
(4) The "two-agent" explanation has the
effect of cutting off inquiry, or at least
pointing it in unproductive directions. Once
you have said that the person took in the
information unconsciously (thus attributing
the inability to articulate the information
to the structure of the person's mind) where
do you go next? But if instead the reason
for the person's inability to articulate the
information is to be found in the structure
of the act being carried out or within the
structure of the perceptual information
available to the person, we have a challenge
to understand that structure and explicate
why some aspects of a performance or a
perception are articulable and some are not.
We are well on our way to an adequate
psychology of skills.

Recently transparency theory has
been applied to the growing literature on
second language acquisition (Brown &
Williams, 1983; Brown, 1986). It provides
a theoretical justification for many of the
major second language observations of the
past twenty years. For example, the concept of "objects of attention" vs.
"instruments of attention" is foundational
to the observation that one acquires
language skill much more effiCiently if the
language is used as a tool in doing
something else rather than being the focus
of direct study. The old psychodynamic
concept of unconscious is a "tack on" as
far as language learning theory is concerned, it leads to no such insights.
It took us fifty years in the development of American psychology to see that
behaviorism was going nowhere.
Hopefully it won't take another fifty for
us to see that excessive mentalism justified
by a computer metaphor, with multiple
processors in the mind, also isn't going
anywhere. I am of the opinion that the
major reason psychological theory has
progressed so slowly and been of so little
help with our practical problems is because
it has been plagued by heavy, occult
explanatory burdens like the so-called
"unconscious mind" and by mistaken
assumptions like atomism.

Bruce L. Brown is Professor of Psychology
at Brigham Young University.
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